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REPUTATION IN BARGAINING  AND  DURABLE 
GOODS MONOPOLY 
BY LAWRENCE  M. AUSUBEL  AND RAYMOND  J. DENECKERE1 
This paper  analyzes  durable  goods  monopoly  in an infinite-horizon,  discrete-time  game. 
We prove that, as the time interval  between  successive  offers  approaches  zero, all seller 
payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported  by subgame  perfect 
equilibria.  This reverses  a well-known  conjecture  of Coase.  Alternatively,  one can interpret 
the model  as a sequential  bargaining  game  with  one-sided  incomplete  information  in which 
an uninformed  seller makes all the offers. Our folk theorem  for seller payoffs equally 
applies  to the set of sequential  equilibria  of this bargaining  game. 
KEYwoRDs:  Durable  goods monopoly,  bargaining,  Coase conjecture,  reputation,  folk 
theorem. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
ASSUME  THAT  A SINGLE  FIRM  CONTROLS  the supply of an infinitely durable good. 
In a classic paper, Ronald Coase (1972) asked what sales plan this monopolist 
would adopt to  maximize her profits. Coase provided a  partial answer by 
observing  that the naive  policy of forever  offering  the good at a static monopoly 
price is not credible.  To paraphrase  Martin  Hellwig  (1975), the monopolist  who 
announces  such a policy cannot "keep a straight  face"-she  has an irresistable 
temptation to cut the price at future dates, to generate additional sales and 
profits. Coase supplemented  his  answer by  conjecturing  that, with rational 
consumer  expectations,  "the competitive  outcome  may be achieved  even if there 
is  but a single supplier."  Several subsequent  authors have produced models 
possessing  subgame  perfect  equilibria  which  support  Coase's  conjecture. 
Nevertheless,  Coase's  original  puzzle  concerning  the optimal  monopoly  pricing 
rule remains  essentially  unsolved.  In this paper,  we propose  an answer:  the firm 
introduces  the durable  good at approximately  the static  monopoly  price.  She then 
follows the  slowest rate of  price descent that enables her to  maintain her 
credibility. As  the time interval between successive  periods of  the game ap- 
proaches  zero, the rate of descent  can be made arbitrarily  slow while preserving 
subgame perfection.  This enables the supplier  to earn nearly static monopoly 
1 The authors'  work  was supported  in part  by National  Science  Foundation  Grants  SES-85-69701 
and IST-86-09129,  by the Kellogg  School's  Paget  Research  Fund  and Esmark  Research  Chair,  and  by 
National Science  Foundation  Grant  SES-83-20464  at the Institute  for Mathematical  Studies  in the 
Social Sciences,  Stanford  University,  Stanford,  California.  The appendices  make substantial  use of 
ideas and analysis contained  in  the papers of  Fudenberg,  Levine, and Tirole (1985) and Gul, 
Sonnenschein,  and Wilson  (1986).  We learned  a great  deal from  these  authors,  and we are  glad to be 
able to acknowledge  our intellectual  debt here. We would also like to thank  Varadarajan  Chari, 
Kenneth  Judd,  David Kreps,  and Roger  Myerson  for helpful  suggestions  and  stimulating  discussions, 
and two anonymous  referees  for comments  which  greatly  improved  the exposition  of this paper.  The 
usual disclaimer  applies. 
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profits.  Thus it is possible,  even  in a durable  goods market,  that a monopoly  is a 
monopoly.2 
The identical reasoning  carries over to bargaining  games with incomplete 
information,  since essentially  the same mathematical  model may depict either a 
continuum  of actual  consumers  with different  valuations  or a single  buyer  with a 
continuum  of possible valuations.  Thus, in an infinite-horizon  bargaining  game 
where the seller makes  repeated  offers  to a buyer  whose valuation  she does not 
know, we prove that there exist sequential  equilibria  where the seller extracts 
essentially  monopoly  surplus. 
In contrast, the Coase conjecture  predicts  that the monopolist's  initial offer 
inexorably  descends  toward  marginal  cost (and her profits  approach  zero) as the 
time interval  between  periods  shrinks  to zero.  The intuition  behind  the conjecture 
is that, once any initial quantity  of the good has been sold, the monopolist  is 
always tempted to sell additional  output,  until the competitive  level is reached. 
But if consumers  expect  the monopolist  to flood the market  "in the twinkling  of 
an eye" (Coase (1972)), they will decline to purchase  at prices much above 
marginal  cost. 
Bulow (1982) analyzed  Coase's  reasoning  in a finite-horizon  model. By back- 
ward induction, Bulow calculated  the monopolist's  best action in each period 
before the last and showed  that it is always  to charge  unambiguously  less than 
the static monopoly price. Stokey (1981) studied the monopolist who lacks 
commitment  powers  in an infinite-horizon  model.  She constructed  an equilibrium 
which is  the limit of  the unique equilibria  of  finite-horizon  versions of  the 
same model, and demonstrated  that it  satisfies the  Coase conjecture.  Gul, 
Sonnenschein,  and Wilson  (1986)  discovered  a continuum  of additional  subgame 
perfect equilibria  in the infinite-horizon  game. However,  they proved  that these 
weak-Markov  equilibria  (subgame  perfect equilibria  in which buyers use "sta- 
tionary"  strategies)  behave  qualitatively  like the backward  induction  equilibrium 
-the  initial price converges  to marginal  cost.? 
The noncooperative  bargaining  literature  developed  in parallel  to the study of 
durable goods monopoly.4  To escape from Rubinstein's  (1982) complete  infor- 
mation result that all bargaining  is concluded  in the first round, this literature 
introduced  incomplete  information  into the bargaining  process.  Incomplete  infor- 
mation often added a continuum  of sequential  equilibria  (e.g., Fudenberg  and 
Tirole (1983)). One modeling  technique,  however,  offered  apparent  promise  for 
2 This provides an answer  to Coase's  puzzle by identifying  the equilibrium  which (subject  to 
credibility)  is most favorable  to the firm.  Given  that the firm  is a monopolist  and has the sole ability 
to make  offers,  this equilibrium  certainly  seems  quite  sensible.  However,  we show  in Theorem  6.4 that 
there exists a continuum  of other  equilibria,  in which the monopolist  may earn substantially  lower 
profits. 
3 Bond and Samuelson  (1984)  examined  a durable  good subject  to depreciation.  The prospect  of 
replacement  sales reduces  the monopolist's  tendency  to cut prices,  when the time interval  between 
periods  is positive;  however,  Coase's  limiting  result  continues  to hold. Kahn (1986) considered  the 
case of increasing  marginal  cost and showed  that this provides  the durable  goods monopolist  with 
some incentive  not to flood  the market  instantaneously.  Consequently,  initial  price  does not converge 
to marginal  cost. 
4 For a thorough  review  of this literature,  see Rubinstein  (1987). REPUTATION IN BARGAINING  513 
yielding results with greater  predictive  value: restricting  the game to one-sided 
offers with one-sided uncertainty.  When the uninformed  party makes all the 
offers (the informed  party only responding  with "yes" or "no"), the complica- 
tions of strategic  communication  largely  disappear.  One may have (unjustifiably 
and, we will show,  incorrectly)  conjectured  from this literature  that the multiplic- 
ity of equilibrium  outcomes  vanished  as well. 
Sobel and Takahashi  (1983) wrote the first paper to explore this approach. 
Their results mirror  those obtained  by Bulow (1982) and Stokey (1981) in the 
durable  goods monopoly  context.  Fudenberg,  Levine,  and Tirole  (1985)  analyzed 
two distinct cases in the infinite-horizon  game. In the case where the buyer's 
valuation  is known discretely  to exceed the seller's,  they proved  that the model 
generically  has a unique  sequential  equilibrium  and that there  is a finite time by 
which all negotiations  conclude.  In the second  (and, we think,  more reasonable) 
case where there is no gap between the lowest buyer valuation  and the seller's 
valuation,  they demonstrated  the existence  of a backward  induction  equilibrium. 
All of the equilibria  they constructed  are weak-Markov  and can be shown to 
satisfy the Coase conjecture. 
The main result of our paper  is a folk theorem  for seller  payoffs,  for the "no 
gap" case.  -As the time interval  between successive  periods approaches  zero in 
durable goods monopoly (bargaining),  the set of  monopolist (seller) payoffs 
associated with subgame  perfect (sequential)  equilibria  expands to the entire 
interval  from zero to static  monopoly  profits. 
We prove our Folk Theorem  by constructing  "reputational  equilibria"  consist- 
ing of a main price path and a punishment  path. The main path starts  with an 
arbitrary  initial price  and follows  with an arbitrarily-slow  (but positive)  real-time 
rate of sales. The punishment  path is taken  from a weak-Markov  equilibrium.  As 
the time interval  between  periods  approaches  zero, adherence  to the main path 
becomes subgame perfect, because (by the Coase conjecture)  the punishment 
becomes increasingly severe. Continuously  varying the initial price and the 
subsequent  rate of sales yields all levels of profit. 
Let us provide  an interpretation  of these  equilibria.  Initially,  consumers  believe 
they are facing a strong  monopolist  who will continue  to adhere  to the main  price 
path specified in the equilibrium.  However,  the moment a deviation  from the 
main price  path occurs,  consumers  decide  they  are  dealing  with  a weak  monopolist 
who has read the Coase  (1972)  paper  (and believes  its message).  The prospect  of 
ruining  her reputation  thus deters  the monopolist  from ever deviating. 
Observe  that the vast multiplicity  of equilibria  in the current  game is not due 
to the presence  of incomplete  information.  "Reputation,"  in our equilibria,  does 
not  involve the seller's type5-buyers  have no  beliefs to  be updated when 
off-equilibrium  behavior  is observed.  Indeed,  the durable  goods monopoly  model 
is a game of complete  information.  In the bargaining  interpretation  of the model, 
the only (observable)  off-equilibrium  buyer  behavior  which  continues  the game  is 
5One can also introduce  reputation  effects  by adding  buyer  uncertainty  about the monopolist's 
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rejection  of a nonpositive  offer,  and so there  is little or no scope for the seller  to 
make alternative  inferences  about the buyer's  type. Hence, an equilibrium  re- 
finement  which acts only to constrain  off-equilibrium  beliefs about type would 
have no effect on the set of equilibrium  payoffs.  Alternatively,  one can limit the 
set of outcomes by restricting  attention  to weak-Markov  equilibria.  We do not 
find this restriction  completely  natural  and, in any case, it is interesting  to see 
what equilibria  arise  when the Markovian  assumption  is relaxed. 
We extend and use two types of results  (which seemingly  endorse  the Coase 
conjecture)  to prove our folk theorem  (which reverses  the Coase conjecture). 
After describing  the model  (Section  2 ) and presenting  a linear  example  (Section 
3), we first demonstrate  a general  existence result on weak-Markov  equilibria 
(Section  4). We then show that  price  paths  associated  with weak-Markov  equilib- 
ria are uniformly  low compared  to the demand  curve  (Section  5). In Section  6, we 
proceed to  establish the folk theorem for seller payoffs, under very general 
conditions.  We conclude  with Section  7. 
2.  THE  MODEL 
We consider a market  for a good which is infinitely  durable,  and which is 
demanded  only in quantity  zero or one. There  is a continuum  of infinitely-lived 
consumers, indexed by q e I=  [0,1]. The preferences  of  these consumers  are 
completely specified by a monotone nonincreasing function f:  [0,1] a-  R  +  satis- 
fying f(q)  > 0 for q e  [0,1), where f(q)  denotes the reservation  value of cus- 
tomer q, and by a common discount rate r. More precisely,  if individual q 
purchases the good at time t  for the price pt, he derives a  net surplus of 
e-  rt[f(q)  -  pt].  Consumers  seek to maximize  their  net surplus.  The monopolist, 
meanwhile, faces a constant marginal  cost of production,  which we assume 
(without loss of generality)  to equal zero. Her objective  is to maximize  the net 
present  value of profits,  using  the same  discount  rate as consumers. 
The monopolist  offers  the durable  good for sale at discrete  moments  in time, 
spaced equally apart. The symbol z  will denote the time interval between 
successive offers, and so sales occur at times t = 0, z, 2z,...,  nz,....  We will 
sometimes  refer to the "period"  n rather  than to the "time" t (=  nz). Within 
each period, the timing of moves is as follows: first, the monopolist  names a 
price; then, consumers  who have not previously  purchased  decide  whether  or not 
to buy. After a time interval  z elapses,  play repeats. 
A strategy  for the monopolist  specifies  the price  she will charge  in each  period, 
as a function  of the history  of prices  charged  in previous  periods  and the history 
of purchases  by consumers.  A strategy  for a consumer  specifies,  in each period, 
whether or not to buy in that period, given the current  price charged  and the 
history  of past prices  and  purchases.  Formally,  let G(z, r) denote  the above  game 
when the time interval  between  successive  sales  is z and payoffs  are discounted  at 
the rate r. Let a be a pure strategy  for the monopolist.  Then a is a sequence  of 
functions  {fn),  a  The function  an at date nz determines  the monopolist's  price 
in period n as a function  of the prices she charged  in previous  periods  and the REPUTATION IN BARGAINING 
actions chosen  by consumers  in the past.  We impose  measurability  restrictions  on 
joint consumer  strategies  below  which  imply  that the set of consumer  acceptances 
in period n,  Q,,  will be a measurable  set, i.e.,Qn  e S2,  where Q2  is the Borel 
a-algebra on  I.  Then an:  yn X  n  -  y,  with  Y=  [0, f(0)]  and  yn  and  Qn the 
n-fold Cartesian  products  of Y and Q2.  A strategy  combination  for consumers  is a 
sequence of functions {T }n)0  where Tn: yn+l  X  2n  X I -  {0,1}  is such that for 
each yn+l E  yn+l  and each BEn  ,  Tn(yn+1,  Bn,  .)  is measurable.  Decision 
"O"  is to be interpreted  as a decision  not to buy in the current  period;  decision 
"1" indicates  that a sale takes  place in the current  period.  Obviously,  we require 
that  Tn(y+'1, B,  q) = 0 for all q E  U-0QJ.6 
Let 2 be the pure strategy  space for the monopolist,  and T be the set of pure 
strategy combinations for consumers.  The strategy profile { a,  ),  with  = 
{  T(  })  0, generates  a path of prices  and sales  which  can be computed  recursively. 
The pattern of prices and sales over time in turn determines  the payoffs to the 
players.  Let 7r(a, r) be the net present  value of profits  generated  by the strategy 
profile  {a,  T},  and let  uq(a, T) be  the discounted net  surplus derived by  con- 
sumer q. The profile { a,  } is a Nash equilibrium  if and only if 
7rT(,  T)  >  7T(a',  T),  VA' e  ,  and 
Uq(o, rq, _  q)  > Uq(o, Tq,  T_q),  Vq  E rTq,  q-a.e., 
where Tq  is the projection  of T  onto the qth component  (and similarly  for Tq).  An 
n-period  history  of the game  is a sequence  of prices  in periods  0,...,  (n -  1) and a 
specification  of the set of consumers  who bought  in each period  prior to n. We 
denote  such a history by the symbol  Hn. Thus,  Hn E ynx  2n. The symbol  Hn, 
refers  to Hn followed  by a price  announced  by the monopolist  in period n. Thus, 
Hn'  E yn+l X Sn. The strategy  profile  (a, T) induces  strategy  profiles  (oI  , rIHn) 
and (ao  H, TI  H),  after the histories  Hn and H,,  respectively.  The strategy  pair 
(a,T)  is  a  subgame perfect equilibrium if  and  only  if  (o I,  HTIH)  is  a  Nash 
equilibrium  in the game  remaining  after  the history  Hn,  for all n and all Hn,  and 
similarly  after any history  H,.  In order  to ensure  the existence  of an equilibrium, 
we will have to allow the monopolist  to mix at any stage of the game. 2  will 
denote her set of behavioral  strategies.  It should be clear to the reader  how to 
extend the above definitions  when behavioral  strategies  are allowed. We will 
henceforth  restrict  attention  to equilibria  in which  deviations  by sets of measure 
zero of consumers  change  neither  the actions of the remaining  consumers  nor 
those of the monopolist.  This requirement  reflects  our quest for equilibria  in 
which consumers  act as price takers.7  Since f(-)  is monotone, and given the 
measure-zero  restriction,  there  is no further  loss of generality  in assuming  that 
f(.)  is left-continuous. 
6 For notational  simplicity,  we chose  to indicate  the domain  of definition  of an to be Yn  X n2  and 
the domain  of definition  of Tn to be yn+ 1 X Qn X I. However,  only elements  of s2n  consistent  with 
the restriction  that a consumer  can accept  at most one offer  by the monopolist  can occur.  One  should 
restrict  the domain  of definition  of ao and T"  accordingly. 
7This restriction  may affect the equilibrium  set, as demonstrated  in Gul, Sonnenschein,  and 
Wilson (1986,  p. 170). 
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Let  qn =  m(U>-OQj)  be the (Lebesgue) measure of customers who have pur- 
chased. The next lemma,  whose proof is given in Fudenberg,  Levine,  and Tirole 
(1985, Lemma 1), will imply that, along any equilibrium  path, the remaining 
buyer valuations  are a truncated  sample  of the original  ones. Consequently,  the 
single number  qn (incompletely)  summarizes  prior  consumer  actions. 
LEMMA  2.1:  In any subgame  perfect equilibrium, after any history Hn, and for 
any  current price p,  there exists  a  cutoff valuation /(p,  Hn)  such  that every 
consumer  with valuation  exceeding 13(  p, Hn) accepts the monopolist  's offer of p and 
every consumer with valuation  less than /(  p, Hn) rejects. 
In general, a buyer's accept/reject decision may depend not only on the 
current price,  p,  but also on  the history, Hn. We define a  weak-Markov 
equilibrium  to be a subgame  perfect equilibrium  in which (after histories that 
contain no simultaneous  buyer deviations  of positive measure;  see footnote 9, 
below) the accept/reject  decisions  of all (remaining)  buyers  depend  only on the 
current  price. The set of all weak-Markov  equilibria  is denoted by the symbol 
Ew(f,  z). 
The buyer's strategy  in a weak-Markov  equilibrium  can be described  by an 
acceptance function P(-),  where consumer  q accepts a price p  if and only if 
p < P(q).  When f (.)  is  strictly monotone, Lemma 2.1 implies that P(.)  is 
nonincreasing.  When  f (.) has flat sections,  P(.)  may  be nonmonotone.  However, 
any consumers  who violate  monotonicity  for P(.) have  identical  valuations,  so by 
permuting them, we  may (without loss  of  generality) assume that  P(-)  is 
monotone. Since deviations  by sets of measure  zero of consumers  do not affect 
the equilibrium,  we further  assume  (still without  loss of generality)  that P(-) is a 
left-continuous,  nonincreasing  function. Thus (after histories that contain no 
buyer deviations), the set  of  remaining  buyers is  an  interval (q, 1], where 
O<q<1. 
For a given weak-Markov  equilibrium,  consider  the net present  value  of profits 
to the monopolist  after  any history  for which  the set of remaining  buyers  (except 
for sets of measure  zero) equals  (q, 1]. Since buyer acceptances  depend only on 
the prices which the monopolist  will henceforth  charge,  this value is a function 
R(.)  of q only, and must satisfy  the dynamic  programming  equation: 
(2.1)  R(q)  =  max  {P(y)(y  -  q) + 3R(y)}, 
yE[q,1] 
where 8  erz.  Observe  that P(y)  > 0, for y E [0,1), and hence that R(y) > 0 
on the same domain.8  Consequently,  (2.1) implies that there are sales in every 
period in any weak-Markov  equilibrium,  until consumers  are exhausted.  More- 
over, in the case of "no gap"  (i.e., f(1) = 0), sales necessarily  occur  over infinite 
8In any subgame  perfect  equilibrium,  the monopolist  only charges  nonnegative  prices  (Fudenberg, 
Levine, and Tirole (1985, L  emma 2)). Thus, a rational  consumer  y  will always accept a price of 
(1 -  8)f(y),  as f(y)  -(1  -  8)f(y)  >  kf ff(y)  -  p},  for all p > 0 and k > 1. Since f(y)  > 0 for all 
y E [0,1), this establishes  P(y)  > (1 -  8)f (y)  > 0. REPUTATION IN BARGAINING  517 
time. This is because  only nonpositive  prices can clear the market  entirely  and 
because it is suboptimal  for the monopolist  to ever charge  a nonpositive  price 
(since P(y)  > 0 for y e [0,1)). 
Let T(q) be the argmax  correspondence  in (2.1) and let t(q) =  inf  { T(q)}. 
Then the monopolist's  equilibrium  action  when  customers  (q, 1] remain  is always 
to charge a price of P(y),  for some y E T(q). Since T(-) is monotone, it is 
single-valued  except at possibly a countable set of  q. Excluding  this set, the 
monopolist's  action depends  only on the summary  statistic q, and in fact is to 
charge the price S(q)  P(t(q)).  Meanwhile,  suppose that the set of remaining 
customers  was brought  to (q, 1] by an offer of P(q), where q has the property 
that T(q) is single-valued.  Buyer optimization  requires  that consumer  q  was 
indifferent  between  the price P(q) and the deferred  offer  S(q). Consequently: 
(2.2)  f (q)  -  P(q)  = 8 [f (q)  -  S(q)]  . 
When T(q) is multiple-valued,  the monopolist  may now mix among  prices  in the 
set P(T(q))  P(y):  y E  T(q)}.  A variant  of (2.2) still holds, where S(q)  is 
replaced  by an element  of the convex  hull of P(T(q)) which  has the interpreta- 
tion of expected  price. If p-1  was the price charged  in the previous  period,  the 
monopolist should now play a (possibly)  mixed strategy  such that the expected 
price, p,  satisfies: 
(2.3)  f (q)-p-1  >  8 [f (q)-p],  but 
f (q ) -p-,  <8 [f (q')  -p],  for  all q' E-(q,l]. 
Such a mixed strategy  justifies the decision of  q to purchase  in the previous 
period and of  all q' E (q, 1] to reject. Proposition  4.3 will demonstrate  that 
randomization  cannot occur along the equilibrium  path except, possibly,  in the 
initial period. 
Equation  (2.2) and  inequality  (2.3)  establish  that  it is sufficient  for a monopolist, 
in optimizing  against  consumers  who use an acceptance  function  P(q),  to utilize 
a strategy  which only depends  on q and the previous  price P-1i It is convenient 
to restrict  attention to equilibria  which have this property.  We will henceforth 
consider  this restriction  part  of the definition  of weak-Markov  equilibrium.  Note, 
via Proposition  4.3, that requiring  the monopolist  to condition only on q and 
p-  does not affect the players'  equilibrium  payoffs  attainable  in weak-Markov 
equilibria. 
Perhaps  a more  natural  Markovian  restriction  would  be to limit the monopolist 
to condition her strategy  on the payoff-relevant  part of the history,  namely q, 
only. Unfortunately,  such  equilibria  (termed  strong-Markov  equilibria)  do not, in 
general, exist (see Fudenberg,  Levine, and Tirole (1985)). In fact, if (P, R) is 
associated with a weak-Markov  equilibrium  and P(-)  is  discontinuous,  it is 
possible to show that randomization  is (generically)  necessary  whenever  Pi  lies 
in a discontinuity  of the range  of P(-). 
One final remark:  for expositional  ease, all of our subsequent  definitions, 
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However,  all  of  our results also  hold  for  the  bargaining game, provided  one 
substitutes "sequential equilibrium"  whenever the phrase "subgame perfect equi- 
librium" appears. It should then be understood that if  F(v)  denotes the (com- 
monly  known)  distribution function  of  buyer valuations,  F(v)=  1 -y,  where 
y = inf { q: f(q)  = v }. Furthermore, qn then corresponds to the seller's point of 
truncation, after history Hn, of her prior distribution on the buyer's valuation. 
3. A LINEAR EXAMPLE 
Consider  a  linear demand example with  unit  slope  and  unit  intercept, i.e., 
f(q)  = 1-  q. Let  z be the time interval between periods. For this case, Stokey 
(1981) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983) proved the existence of a strong-Markov 
equilibrium in which the monopolist charges a price equalling az(l  -  q) after any 
history in which all consumers (q, 1] remain, and earns a corresponding profit of 
R(q)  = (a/2)(1  -  q)2.  These  authors also  showed  that  limz  0az=0,  thereby 
confirming the Coase conjecture. 
We will now indicate how to construct reputational equilibria which yield the 
monopolist,  for sufficiently small z, essentially any payoff between zero and static 
monopoly  profits.  Consider  a  strategy  in  which  the  monopolist  follows  an 
exponentially  descending price path p(t)  =poe-  t  (confined to the grid of times 
(0, z, 2z,...  }),  as long as no deviation from this rule has occurred in the past, 
and reverts to  the strong-Markov equilibrium described above, otherwise. Con- 
sumers adopt strategies which are optimal given this behavior. 
Fix  the real-time rate of  descent  q > 0 to be  sufficiently slow that, indepen- 
dently of z, the sales in the initial period are bounded away from zero. For any 
time interval  z > 0, let the (equilibrium path) price in period  n be  Pn  p(nz). 
Then, by consumer indifference, the set of consumers remaining after period  n 
equals (qnl,,  1], where qn,+  satisfies: f(qn+l)  - pn = 8[f(qn+1)  -  Pn+l]  Hence, 
f(qn  +l)  =pn[(1 -  8e- ')/(1  -  8)].  Since demand is  linear, this  establishes that 
sales exponentially  descend at the same rate 71,  and that the price and sales in 
every period are constant multiples of (1 -  qn). Consequently, along the equilib- 
rium path, the continuation profits evaluated in any period n > 1 are a constant 
multiple,  XZ, of  (1 - qn)2.  Observe  that  as  the  interval  z  approaches  zero, 
consumers purchase at arbitrarily close  to the times that they would against a 
continuous-time  price path  poe-'.  Thus,  -->  X > 0,  where  X is  the constant 
derived from a profit calculation along a continuous time path. 
In  every period, the monopolist must weigh continuation profits against the 
payoff from optimally deviating. Any deviation causes the consumers to instantly 
adopt  the acceptance function from the strong-Markov equilibrium. Hence, the 
optimal derivation when customers (qn, 1] remain yields profits of exactly R(qn) 
= (az/2)(1  -  qn)2. Observe that there exists z1 > 0 such that whenever the time 
interval  satisfies 0 < z < zl,  we  have  az/2  < Xz, deterring deviations  from  the 
continuation path in all periods n > 1. Meanwhile, let  ro(,,  z) denote the seller's 
equilibrium  profits  evaluated in  period  zero.  Since  limZ,0o(,  z) >0,  there 
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exists Z2 (0 <  Z2 <  Z1) such  that  whenever  the time  interval  satisfies  0 <  Z  <  Z2, we 
have az/2 <0Q(,q,  z), deterring  deviations  in period  zero as well. 
Finally, note that limz 1  ogo(,  z) = po(l  - po)  and that static monopoly profits 
equal 1/4.  We conclude  that by continuously  varying  the initial  price po and the 
rate of descent n, and by making z sufficiently  small, every  level of profits  in 
(0,1/4)  can be sustained. 
4. EXISTENCE  OF WEAK-MARKOV  EQUILIBRIA 
In order to extend the reasoning  of the previous  section to general  demand 
curves,  we need to demonstrate  two facts which were demonstrated  by formula 
for the linear  case. We lay this groundwork  here  and in the next section.  First,  we 
show the existence of weak-Markov  equilibria  for general  demand curves (see 
also Appendix  A). This gives  us well-defined  secondary  paths,  reverted  to in case 
of deviation  from the proposed  equilibrium  path. Then,  in Section  5, we demon- 
strate  that these secondary  paths  become  uniformly  low (compared  to the highest 
valuation  remaining)  as z approaches  zero, enabling  them to be effective  deter- 
rents. 
We begin by defining  general  demand  curves. 
DEFINITION  4.1: An (inverse) demand  curve  f  is a nonnegative-valued,  left- 
continuous,  nonincreasing  function  on [0,11  which,  without  loss of generality,  we 
normalize  so that f(O)  = 1 and f(q)  > 0 whenever  0 < q < 1. 
Using this terminology,  we prove the following  theorem  in Appendix  A:9 
THEOREM 4.2 (Existence  of Weak-Markov  Equilibria):  Let f be any (inverse) 
demand curve. Then  for every r > 0 and every z > 0,  there exists a weak-Markov 
equilibrium. 
This  theorem strengthens  results by  Fudenberg-Levine-Tirole  (1985), who 
prove existence  for differentiable  demand  curves  with derivative  bounded  below 
and above, and Gul-Sonnenschein-Wilson  (1986), who prove existence for de- 
mand curves  with f(l)  > 0 that satisfy a Lipschitz  condition  at 1. For example, 
Theorem 4.2 extends existence  to nondifferentiable  and possibly discontinuous 
curves  with f(l)  = 0. It also contains  the case where  f(1) > 0 but f'(1) is infinite. 
The proof of Theorem  4.2 may be of some general  interest,  since  it uses a version 
9We  follow the tradition  of Gul, Sonnenschein,  and  Wilson  (1986,  pp. 159-160) of not specifying 
equilibrium  behavior  following  simultaneous deviations  by consumers.  This is formally  correct  in the 
case of a durable  goods  monopoly  since  any such  deviation  will lead to a rescaled  (see Definition  5.2) 
demand curve satisfying  the conditions  of Theorem  4.2. We can thus specify a subgame  perfect 
equilibrium  which  is played  from  that  node  onward.  Note, however,  that  neither  of the  prior  existence 
theorems  would guarantee  existence  of equilibria  following  (off-equilibrium)  nonmonotone  purchase 
behavior  by consumers.  Notice also that in the bargaining  interpretation  of the model,  simultaneous 
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of  the maximum theorem which does not require objective functions to  be 
continuous.  In Appendix  A, we also establish  the following  theorem: 
PROPOSITION  4.3:  Along any  weak-Markov equilibrium  path,  the monopolist 
does not randomize, except (possibly)  in the initial period. 
5. THE UNIFORM COASE  CONJECTURE 
In this section,  we strengthen  the "Coase  conjecture"  by presenting  a theorem 
that guarantees  uniformly  low prices  for all weak-Markov  equilibria  of families  of 
demand  curves. 
While the uniform  Coase conjecture  is of independent  interest,  we require  it 
here as an intermediate  step for use in the main result of the paper: the folk 
theorem  of Section  6. It should  be observed  that there  is a straightforward  reason 
why we did not need to examine  families  of demand  curves  to treat the linear 
case in Section 3: given linear  demand,  every derived  residual  demand  curve  is 
linear  as well.10  For generic  demand  curves,  however,  the residual  demand  curves 
are no  longer rescaled versions of  the original one. Thus, considerations  of 
subgame  perfection  lead us naturally  to study  families  of demand  curves.  We will 
demonstrate,  for all residual  demand  curves  arising  from a demand  curve  f,  that 
all price  paths derived  from  weak-Markov  equilibria  are uniformly  low compared 
to the highest  remaining  consumer  valuation.  This establishes  that weak-Markov 
price paths may be  used to  deter deviation from the main price paths of 
reputational  equilibria. 
Define FL, M,  a  to be the family of ctemand curves  which are enveloped  by 
scalar multiples of demand curves (1 -  q)a,  for some positive a. To be precise, we 
have the following  definition: 
DEFINITION  5.1: For 0 < M < 1 < L < oo and a > 0,  L, M,a  is the set of all 
(inverse) demand curves f(t)  such that M(1 -  X)a  < f(x)  < L(1  -  X)a,  for all 
x E [0, 1]. 
The only significant  restriction  implicit in the definition  of  ,L  M,  a  is  that 
f(1) = 0. Otherwise,  the family is very general.  It allows, for example,  differen- 
tiable demand curves  with derivatives  bounded  above and bounded  away from 
zero, demand  curves  which  are  not Lipschitz-continuous  at 1, and demand  curves 
which are severely  discontinuous. 
Let us also define  a rescaled  residual  demand  curve  as a normalized  version  of 
the demand  that remains  after  any proportion  of customers  have purchased: 
10 Identical reasoning applies to  the case where f(q)  =  (1 -  q)a, considered  by  Sobel and 
Takahashi  (1983). Furthermore,  this is the only family that is closed under  the joint operation  of 
truncation  and rescaling  (see Definition  5.2). REPUTATION IN BARGAINING 
DEFINITION 5.2:  Let f  be any demand curve. We define fq to be the rescaled 
residual (inverse)  demand curve off  at q (0 < q < 1) by: 
f[q+(1-q)x] 
fq(X)=  f(  q)  for all x  [0,1]. 
LEMMA  5.3:  Iff  E,L,  M,a,  then  for every q (0 < q <  1), fq  =YL/M,  M/L,a. 
PROOF:  Observe that 
f(q  +  (1 -  q)x)  =f(1  -  (1 -  q)(1  -  x)) 
< L(1-q)a(l-  x)a 
and 
f(q  + (1 -  q)x)  > M(1-  q)Y(1-  x)Y. 
Also, 
M(1  -  q)a <f(q)  < L(1-  q)a, 
so 
M  f[q+(1-q)x]  L 
L(1-x)  <  f()  M(1-  x)'  L  f(q)  M 
proving the desired result.  Q.E.D. 
Let  L = L'/M'  and M = M'/L'.  Lemma 5.3 demonstrates that if f  EFL',  M', a 
then all residual demand curves arising from f  are elements of  L,  M,  . Hence, if 
we can show that the initial price is uniformly low for all demand curves in the 
family  L, M,  a,  then we will also have established that all price paths arising from 
weak-Markov equilibria are uniformly low (compared to residual demand). We 
prove this fact in the following theorem: 
THEOREM  5.4 (The Uniform Coase Conjecture):  For every L > 1, 0 < M < 1, 
0 < a <  oo and e > 0, there exists z(L,  M, a, e) such that  for every  f E ,L, M, a  for 
every z  satisfying  0 < z < z(L,  M, a, e),  and for every weak-Markov equilibrium 
(P,  R)  E wm(f, z),  the monopolist  charges an initial price less than or equal to e 
(and earns profits less than e). 
PROOF: See Appendix B. 
A uniform Coase conjecture also holds when f(1)  > 0. Consider the family of 
demand curves satisfying f(1)  < c and M(1 -  x)'  <f(x)  -f(1)  < L(1 -  x)", for 
all  x e  [0,1].  Then  an analogous result to  Theorem 5.4 holds  for this  family, 
provided one substitutes "f(1) + e" for the bound on the initial price and profits. 
6. THE FOLK THEOREM  FOR SELLER  PAYOFFS 
In this section, we prove Theorem 6.4, the main result of the paper. First, let 
SE(f,  r, z)  denote,  for  the  durable  goods  monopoly  model,  the  set  of  all 
monopolist  payoffs  arising from subgame perfect equilibria when  the  demand 
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curve is f,  the interest  rate is r, and the time interval  between  periods  is z. For 
the bargaining  game  with one-sided  incomplete  information,  the same  expression 
denotes the set of all seller  payoffs  arising  from sequential  equilibria.  Theorem 
6.4 will establish that SE(f,  r, z)  expands to the entire interval  from zero to 
static monopoly  profits,  as the time interval  z approaches  zero. Its proof utilizes 
the fact that f E  L, M,a  has the uniform Coase property, which we now define: 
DEFINITION  6.1:  We will  say that f  has  the  uniform Coase property if,  for 
some zI > 0: 
)  there exists a subgame  perfect equilibrium  (ao,  Tr)  for all games with 
time interval  z between  periods,  where  0 < z < z1, and, 
for every e > 0, there exists Z(e) (O  < ,(e)  < Zl) such that S,(q)/f(q)  < 
(6.2)  e, for all z (0 < z < Z(e))  and all q (0 < q < 1), 
where S,(q)  denotes the supremum  of all prices that the monopolist charges 
using strategy  oz when the current  state equals  q (the supremum  is taken  over all 
possible price histories). 
LEMMA  6.2:  If f  E  L,  M,a,  then  f has the uniform Coase property. 
PROOF: Suppose  fELM,,,,.  Then  by  Theorem  4.2  there  exists  (ao,y)e 
Ewm(f, z)  for all z > 0. We wish to show that {ao,  },  T>0  satisfies (6.2). Observe, 
for any z,  that (o, T,)  induces a weak-Markov  equilibrium  for any residual 
demand  curve  arising from  f.  Define  (az q, ,q)  by  multiplying  all  prices  in 
(a,, T,) by f(q);  observe that (a, q,  ,  q) is  a weak-Markov equilibrium for the 
rescaled  residual  demand  curve  fq, for all 0 < q < 1. (See Definition  5.2.) 
Using the notation  in Definition  6.1, observe  that Sz(q) = f(q)S,  q(O).  Further 
observe, by Lemma 5.3, that fq eL,'  M',  a  where L' -  L/M  and M'  M/L.  By 
the uniform Coase conjecture  (Theorem  5.4), for every e > 0, there exists Z(e) 
such that the initial  price  in any weak-Markov  equilibrium  is less than e, for any 
z  (0 < z < z)  and any demand curve in  L',  M,  .  We conclude that (6.2) holds. 
Q.E.D. 
Fudenberg,  Levine, and Tirole (1985) have shown that Sz(q)>,f(l),  for all 
q E [0,1), in any subgame  perfect  equilibrium.  Hence,  in the case of a "gap"  (i.e., 
f(1) > 0), the uniform Coase property  cannot hold. Indeed, these authors  and 
Gul, Sonnenschein,  and Wilson (1986) demonstrated  that when f(1)>  0 and 
f(q)  -f(1)  < L(1 -  q),  for  some  L < oo,  there  exists  a  (generically)  unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium. Obviously, if f E  ML,  Ma,, there is no gap, and hence 
there is scope for a folk theorem. 
Let p1 denote the price  actually  charged  in period i (0 < i < n -  1). 
DEFINITION  6.3: For any p=  (Pn  }°0,  any q~=  {(q)=0,  and any monopolist 
strategy  a, define the reputational  price  strategy  ( p',  q, a) by: 
pn  aPn,  if p=  pi  and Qi  =  [qi,  i+l]  forall  i (O  < i  n -  1), 
(oN,  otherwise, 
where the set equality  is up to sets of measure  zero. 
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We will further call (p, q',)  a  reputational  equilibrium  if this reputational 
price strategy,  in conjunction  with optimal  consumer  behavior,  forms  a subgame 
perfect equilibrium. 
Observe  that the definition  of reputational  equilibrium  requires  that strategy  a, 
by  itself, be  associated with a  subgame perfect equilibrium.  A  reputational 
equilibrium  is defined  analogously  for the bargaining  game;  note that "q" is then 
omitted.  We can now state and prove the main result. 
THEOREM  6.4 (The Folk Theorem for Seller Payoffs):  Let f belong to  L,  M,a 
and let rr*  denote static monopoly  profits. Then  for every real interest  rate r > 0 and 
for  every e > 0,  there exists a z > 0  such that whenever the time interval between 
successive offers satisfies 0 < z < z: 
(6.3)  [£,  *-£]  cSE(f,r,z). 
PROOF: By Lemma 6.2, f  has the uniform Coase property. Let {  (o,  Tz o  < z < 
be  the  family of  subgame perfect equilibria guaranteed  by  (6.1), and let 
{  S)0  < z<  be  defined  as  in  Definition  6.1.  Define  the  function  g(z)= 
sup {Sx(q)/f(q):  0 < x < z and 0 < q < 1).  Observe that g(z)  is well defined for 
0 < z < zl, since Sz is defined  and Sz(q)/f(q)  is uniformly  bounded  above  by 1. 
Further observe, by (6.2), that limoz 0g(z) = 0. By definition, qo  = 0. Choose 
arbitrary  sales q1 in period  zero  (0 < q1 < 1). Let us define  an exponential  rate of 
subsequent  sales by: 
(6.4)  1 - 
qn+  =  e-naz(rz+g(z))(1  -  ql),  for any a > 0 and all n > 0. 
Our first step is to construct  a price sequence {Pn}n  __O  which yields sales of 
(qn+i  -  qn)  in period n  (for all n > 0).  Observe  that if 0 < qi < 1, then (6.4) 
implies sales in all periods.  To make  consumer  qn+1  indifferent  between  purchas- 
ing at price p, in period n and at price  Pn+  1 one period  later,  we must have: 
(6.5)  f(qn+l)  -Pn  = 8[f(qn+)  -Pn+l],  for all n > 0, 
where 8 = e-rz. Solving  for Pn and telescoping  the resulting  summation  yields: 
00 
(6.6)  Pn = (1-8)  E  8  (qn+l+k),  n > O. 
k=0 
Furthermore,  the price  sequence  p-  { pn  }n°  implied  by (6.4) and (6.6) satisfies 
f(qn+ 1) >--Pn (for all n > 0) and equation (6.5), proving that consumers optimize 
along the sales path q--  { qn  }n=1' 
CLAIM  1:  For any ql  (0  q  < 1<l), there exists a>  0  and  i>  0  such that 
(,  q,  z)  defined by (6.4) and (6.6) is  a  reputational  equilibrium  for all  z 
satisfying 0 < z < z < z1. 
PROOF  OF CLAIM  1:  Let  Tn  denote profits  starting  from period n if the price 
path p is followed in all periods.  Define m to be the least integer  greater  than 
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I/z. Certainly  z,1  3",  ,  -  ,  Observe that  m  1 =  eq(-mq1)rz 
-  e 
and,  by  (6.4),  qn+  -  qn  =  (1 -  qn) -  (1 -  qn+  )  1  (1 -  qn)(1 -  e  a(rz+g(z)))  for 
all  n > 1.  Meanwhile, by  (6.6),  Pn±m  ~  (1 -  >  1f(qn±2m) 




-ar  +gz) 
and by similar reasoning, 
(6.8)  >n  q,po ->  q((  -  e-  r)f(qm). 
Now,  let Trn  denote profits starting from period n if (az, TJ)  is followed.  Let q 
(0 < q <  1) denote  a customer and let  Pq denote the price at which customer q 
purchases, according to (az, rT).  Let p4 denote the next (expected) price charged 
after Pql following  aq. Observe by the definition of  g(z)  that p4  g(z)f(q).  By 
consumer optimization, f(q)  -  Pq   3[f(q)  -  p41.  Together these inequalities im- 
ply pq  < [1 -38 +3Sg(z)]f(q),  for all q (O  q < 1), and so: 
(6.9)  nz  <[1-3±3g(z)J  ff(q)dq,  for all  n >  0. 
Observe that the bound of (6.9) is a consequence of the uniform Coase property, 
but does not follow from the ordinary Coase conjecture. 
Let a = (8L/M)[e-r(1  -  e -)]  -.  To prove subgame perfection, we must show 
that  r,,  g  g,,Z,  for  all  n > 0.  Observe that  there exists  z2  such  that  for  all  z 
(O < z < z2):  1 -  e  a[g(z)±rz]>  (a/2)[g(z)  + rz].  Hence,  (6.7) implies  that  7n,,  > 
4(L/M)(g(z)  + rz)(1 -  qn)f(qn±2m)  for  all  n >  1  and  0 < z < z2.  Since  qn  < 
qn±2m < 1 and f  is monotone nonincreasing: 
J1f  (q)  dq <  (qn±2m 
-  qn)f (qn)  ±  (1 -  q+mf(n2) 
Observe  that  JE.L,  m,  implies  f(q)  < (L/M)1  -f(q')  whenever  (1 -  q')l 
(1 -  q) = f.  By (6.4), (1 -  qn  2m)/(1 -  q)  = fi(z),  for all n, where limz,  P0(z) 
=  1. Consequently, there exists z3 > 0 such that f(qn)  (2L/M)f(qn±2m),  and 
hence J~f(q)  dq < (2L/M)(1  -  q )f(q,,,),  for all n >  1 and for all z (0 < z < 
z3). Finally, there exists z4 > 0 such that [1 -  3 + 3g(z)]  < 2[g(z)  + rz] for all z 
(O  < z < z4).  Hence, for all z  satisfying  0 < z < minm  zl,  z2,  Z3, z4  and for all 
n > 1,  we have by (6.9) that  r  > Itnz.  It can easily be shown that we may set  F so 
that  ?t,> iroz  for all z (0 < z < Z) as well. 
CLAIM  2:  For any q (O  < q < 1) and any X (O  < X < 1),  there exists i > O such 
that  for  every z  (0 < z < Z), there is a reputational equilibrium with profits at 
least  Xqf(q). 
PROOF OF CLAIM  2:  Set  q, =  v/Kq. Define  m  to  be  the least integer greater 
than  -log(1  -  VK  )/rz.  (Observe that e -rz  =1  -  1K.) Now  define {q  qn=2 
by  (6.4).  Then for  arbitrary  a>  0,  there exists  z5  such that for  every z 
(O <  z  <z5),  qm  < q.  By  (6.6),  Po > (1 -  S)Em J3kf(qk  1)>  (1)  -  "m)f(qm) 
  [1 - (1  -  K)]f(q)  = v'Kf(q),  whenever 0 < z < z5. Hence,  T0 > p0ql > Xqf  f(q). 
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Using  Claim  1,  there exists  z > 0  such that ( p, q, oz) defined using  ql =- VXq, 
(6.4)  and  (6.6)  is  a  reputational  equilibrium,  for  all  z  (0 < z <  ),  proving 
Claim 2. 
REMAINDER  OF  PROOF  OF  THEOREM  6.4:  Given any ql, let the quantity path q 
be  defined by  (6.4),  let the price path  p  be  defined by  (6.6),  and let  T(q1, z) 
denote the profits associated with q and p. Then: 
00  00 
(6.10)  r(ql,  z)  =  E  kr(qk+l 
- 
qk)Pk  =  ql  +  E  (qk+l-  qk)Pk. 
k=O  k=l 
Suppose  q[ > ql,  and  define  q'  and  p'  analogously.  Observe, by  (6.4),  that 
q+1  -q  <  fqk+  l  -- qka  for  a  1,  d  byll  k >O. 
Hence,  using  (6.10),  7r(q,  z)  <  r(ql,  z)  +  Iq  -  qll.  Define  r(ql,  z)  = 
sup { r(q, z):  0 < q < ql}.  Observe that  X  is monotone nondecreasing in ql  and 
also satisfies  (q',  z) < f(ql,  z) +  Iq  -  qll.  Thus, X is continuous in ql, for any 
z>  0. 
Let  r* = supo  q  qf (q)  and choose q* so that  qr*  = q*f(q*).  Given  e (0 < e 
< 7r*), define  X = [7r*  -  £]/7r*. By Claim 2,  there exists  z6 > 0  such that there 
exists  a  reputational  equilibrium with  profits at  least  XTr*  =  r* -  e  whenever 
0 < z < z.  Also, using (6.10), observe that limoz  r(0, z) = 0, and so there exists 
z7 > 0 such that 7r(0,  z) < e whenever 0 < z < z7. Finally, by Claim 1, there exists 
8 > 0  such  that  (pq, ',  )  defined  from  q  = 0  is  a  reputational  equilibrium 
whenever 0 < z < Z. 
Define z = min {,  z, z,  Z  }. Then for any z satisfying 0 < z < z, 7r(0,  z) < e and 
r(v/Xq*, z) > I*  -  e.  Furthermore, we  have  already  shown  that  7rT  > rz  for 
0 < z < z and n > 1, so (ip,  ', ao) is a reputational equilibrium for all q1 that yield 
%o  >  rT(0, z).  Finally,  since  7(ql,  z)  is continuous  in ql,  the set  {  T(ql, z):  0 <  ql < 
/X-q*  and  7r(ql, z) >  r(0, z)}  is  an  interval.  Since  e  and  r* -  e  are  both 
contained in that interval, we have established (6.3).  Q.E.D. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Consider  the outcome of  durable goods  monopoly  (or bargaining) when the 
time interval between successive periods approaches infinity. In this situation, the 
monopolist  (seller)  has  close  to  unlimited  commitment  power,  and  thus  her 
maximum equilibrium payoff approaches static monopoly profits. Meanwhile, as 
we  demonstrated in  the Folk Theorem, the same outcome is  attainable in  the 
limit as the time interval between periods approaches zero. We conclude that the 
"maximum  possible  seller  surplus" is  minimized  at  some  intermediate  time 
interval-let  us call this the time interval of least commitment. 
We explain this phenomenon as the result of two countervailing forces. When 
the time interval between periods is short, reputational effects may be devastat- 
ingly  effective in preserving monopoly  power. When the time interval between 
periods  is  long,  reputational effects are superfluous. The most  adverse circum- 
stance for the monopolist may be when the time interval is just long enough to 
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preclude reputational  equilibria  (but still sufficiently  short that the inability to 
commit is a problem). 
Let us also explain  the somewhat  unexpected  discontinuity  in the equilibrium 
set, based on  whether or not there is  separation  between seller and buyer 
valuations.  Fudenberg,  Levine,  and Tirole  (1985)  demonstrated  that  in the case of 
a "gap" between seller and buyer valuations  (and subject to some regularity 
conditions) there is a uniform  finite bound to the number  of periods in which 
sales can occur in any subgame  perfect equilibrium.  Backward  induction then 
forces subgame perfect equilibria  to be Markovian,  and the Coase conjecture 
drives the initial price near the lowest buyer  valuation.  However,  in the case of 
"no gap" treated  here,  sales necessarily  occur  over  infinite  time.  There  is no last 
period  from  which  to apply  backward  induction,  and reputation  supports  equilib- 
ria which approximate  static  monopoly  pricing. 
We can also draw an interesting  comparison  between the present monopoly 
model and the analogous  oligopoly  model (Ausubel  and Deneckere  (1987) and 
Gul (1987)). Folk theorems  for  joint profits  hold in the durable  goods oligopoly, 
even when there is a "gap,"  because oligopolists  can extend sales over infinite 
time. This defeats  monopoly  results  driven  by backward  induction.  Moreover,  the 
oligopolists' joint  profits may exceed the monopolist's theoretical  maximum 
(when the time interval  between  periods  is short),  since Bertrand  competition  is a 
more severe  "  punishment"  than Coase  pricing. 
A limitation  of the present  analysis  is that our Folk Theorem  is only stated  in 
terms  of seller payoffs,  and that we examine  a model where  only the uninformed 
party makes  offers.  We extend  our results  to buyer  payoffs  and to other  extensive 
forms in a sequel (Ausubel  and Deneckere  (1989)).  In particular,  there  is a folk 
theorem  for seller  payoffs  in the alternating-offer  game  if and only if the (lowest) 
monopoly  price does not exceed  one-half  the highest  buyer  valuation. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXISTENCE  OF  WEAK-MARKOV  EQUILIBRIA 
DEFINITION  A.1:  Let  P(.)  and  R(.)  be left-continuous functions on [q,1],  where 0  q-  <  1, and 
let  P(.)  be  nonincreasing  and  nonnegative.  We  will  say  that  (P,  R)  supports a  weak-Markov 
equilibrium on [q, 1] for (inverse) demand curve f(-)  if equations (2.1) and (2.2) are satisfied for every 
q  E  [ q,  1). 
We have already argued in Section 2 that if (P,  R) is associated with a weak-Markov equilibrium, 
then  (2.1) holds  for all  q E [0, 1] and (2.2) is satisfied at all continuity points  of  t(.)  in [0,1].  The 
left-continuity  of  f(-),  P(-),  and  t(-),  and the monotonicity  of  T(.),  imply  that (2.2)  must hold 
everywhere. Conversely, suppose (2.1) and (2.2) are satisfied for all elements of [q, 1). Then if the state 
q E  [q,1)  and  if  the  previous price,  P-1,  was  in  the  range of  P(.),  we  specify  a  weak-Markov REPUTATION IN BARGAINING 
equilibrium  by  requiring that  all  consumers  y  accept  if  and  only  if  P(y)  p_l  and  that  the 
monopolist  charge S(q') in the next period, where q' = sup {y  E [q, 1): P(y)  >P-1  }. If P-1  was not 
in the range of P(.),  consumers accept using the same rule, but the monopolist randomizes in the next 
period between sup P(T(q))  and inf P(T(q))  in such a way that the expected price, p,  satisfies (2.3). 
That such a randomization is possible can be demonstrated using (2.2). 
LEMMA  A.2:  Suppose that (P,  R)  supports a  weak-Markov equilibrium on  [q,1].  Then R(-)  is 
decreasing and Lipschitz continuous,  satisfying: 0 < R(ql)  -  R(q2) <  q2 -  ql, whenever  q < q1 <<  q2  1. 
PROOF:  Observe  that  R(ql)  >  [t(q2)-  ql]P(t(q2))  +  8R(t(q2))  >  [t(q2)  -  q2]P(t(q2))  + 
8R(t(q2))  = R(q2),  since P(x)  >  (1 -  8)f(x)  > 0 for all x E [q, 1). Meanwhile, define tl(ql)  = t(ql), 
t2(ql)=  t(t(ql)),  etc. Then the monopolist, starting from q2, has the option of selecting a sales path 
equal to max {q2, tk(q)},  for k = 1,2,3,....  This assures R(q2) >  R(ql)  - (q2  -  ql).  Q.E.D. 
LEMMA  A.3:11 Suppose that (P7, Rq) supports  a weak-Markov  equilibrium  on [q, 1], where 0 < q < 1. 
Then there exists  (P,  R)  which supports a weak-Markov equilibrium  on [0,1],  with the property that 
P(q)  = Pq(q)  and R(q)  = R(q)  for all q E [q, 1]. 
PROOF:  We  proceed  constructively. Let  q' = max {0,  -  (1 -  8)Rq(q)/2).  Observe  that  q<  1 
implies  R(q)  > 0 and so q' < q. Let us extend  Rq(-)  to Rq,(-) defined on [q',1]  by: 
(A.1)  Rq,(q)  = maxy[q,1n[  1] { [y  -  q]Pq(y)  + 8R,(y)  , 
and define  tq,(q)  to be  the infimum of  the argmax correspondence of  (A.1). Also  extend  Pq(')  to 
Pq,(.)  defined on [q',1] by: 
(A.2)  Pq,(q)  =  (1 -8)f(q)  + 8Pq(t,(q)). 
It should now be observed that (Pq,, Rq,) satisfy: 
(A.3)  Rq,(q)  = maxy[q,l]  {[y-q]Pq,(y)  + 8R,(y)),  for all  qE  [',1], 
using (A.1)  and  the fact that, for v E [q, q], [v -  q]P,(v)  + 8Rq,(v) < (1/2)(1  -  8)R(q)  + 8Rq,(v) 
< (1/2)(1  -  8)Rq-(q)  + 8Rq,(q) < Rq,(q).  Thus, (Pq, Rq,) supports a weak-Markov equilibrium on 
[4',1].  A  finite number of  repetitions of  the above argument extends  (Pq, R)  to  the entire unit 
interval.  Q.E.D. 
We will now introduce some notation and state a result which we use in proving Theorem 4.2. Let 
X  and  Y  be  compact,  nonempty  subsets  of  R.  Let  J,  (n = 1,2,...)  and  J:  X-.  Y  be  upper 
semicontinuous functions. Define R(Jn) = max { J(x):  x E X}, and T(Jn) =  x E X: Jn(x) = R(Jn)}, 
and  similarly  for  R(J)  and  T(J).  Also  define:  J.(x)=conv{y:  y=lim,_o  J(x,),  for  some 
(x, )_1l c  X  such  that  xi-,  x};  G(Jn) = graph of  J.;  and  B,(J)  =  {(x',  y') E XX  Y:  II(x',  y') - 
(x,  y)ll < e for some (x, y) E G(Jn)}. Finally, define: 
(A.4)  p(J,J)  = inf{e>0:  G(J)  c  B(Jn)  andG(J,,)  c  B(J)}. 
We  may  now  state  a  generalization of  the  theorem of  the maximum which  does  not  require 
continuity of the objective. A proof may be found in Ausubel and Deneckere (1988): 
THEOREM  OF THE MAXIMUM:  Suppose  Jn  ()  and J(  )  are upper semicontinuous  functions  from  X into 
Y,  and  suppose  limn,,_  p(J,  J.) =0.  Then  limn.o  R(J.)=  R(J)  and  any  cluster point  from 
{T(Jn)}=  1 is an element of T(J). 
We are now ready to prove the following theorem: 
11  This lemma builds on Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985, Lemma 3) and Gul, Sonnenschein, 
and Wilson (1986, Lemma 5). 
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THEOREM  4.2  (Existence  of  Weak-Markov Equilibria):  Let f  be  any  (inverse)  demand curve 
satisfying Definition 4.1. Then  for every r > 0 and every z > 0, there exists a weak-Markov equilibrium. 
PROOF: Consider the sequence of demand curves: 
f/(q)  if  0  q  (n -1)/n, 
nq)  (n -  nq)f((n-1  )/n)+  (1-n+  nq)f(l1),  if (n -  1)/n  < q l1. 
Observe that f,  and f  differ only on ((n -  )/n,1]  and that, for every n, f,  is linear on  the latter 
interval.  Hence,  one  can  explicitly  calculate  a  linear-quadratic pair  (P,,  R,)  which  supports  a 
strong-Markov equilibrium on [(n -  l)/n,  1] for f,.  (See Section 3.) By Lemma A.3, this pair can be 
extended to (P,,  R,)  which supports an equilibrium on the entire unit interval. 
Without loss  of  generality, we may assume that  {  Pn  },L  converges pointwise for all rationals in 
[0,1]. (This can be assured by taking successive subsequences and applying a diagonal argument.) For 
every rational r E [0,1], let  ¢  (r) = limn,,  P(r).  Define P(0) =  (0) and, for every x  E  (0,1], define 
P(x)  = limk  (Io  (rk),  where each  rk is  rational  and  rk  Ix.  Observe  that  P(-)  is  well-defined, 
nonincreasing,  and left continuous. Without loss  of  generality, we may also assume that  {  R,,  }°° 
converges uniformly to a continuous function, which we denote by R(.).  (This is made possible by 
Lemma  A.2,  which implies that  {  R,n}  =l  is  an equicontinuous family which thus has a uniformly 
convergent  subsequence.)  The  remainder of  the  proof  will  establish  that  the  constructed (P,  R) 
supports a weak-Markov equilibrium on [0,1] for the (limit) demand curve f. 
Define  Jn(q, y) = [y -  q]P,(y)  + 8Rn(y)  and J(q, y) = [y -  q]P(y)  + 8R(y).  Also define T,(q) 
=argmax{J,(q,  y):  y  [q, 1]}  and  T(q)  analogously.  Finally,  let  tn(q)=inf  T(q)  and  t(q)= 
inf T(q).  We  will  now  argue that  p(J(q,  *), J,(q,  .)) --  0.  The  theorem of  the  maximum is  then 
applicable, establishing that (2.1) is satisfied, for all q e  [0,1]. 
Select arbitrary e > 0. Cover the closure of G(P)  with e/5-balls.  Take a finite subcover, denoting 
the  centers  (x,,  P(xi)),lj,  where  x, < x,+  for  all  i  I.  By  the  definition  of  P(.),  there exist 
rationals {y, },E,  such that ly, -  x,I <  E/5  and I  (y,) -  P(xi)I  < e/5.  Furthermore, there exists N1 
such that for all n > Nl,  and all i E I,  IP,(y,)-  ((y,)I  < e/5.  Hence, the distance from (y,,  Pn(y,)) 
to  (x,,  P(x,))  is  less  than 3e/5,  and  so  the  E-ball centered  at  (y,,  Pn(y,))  contains  the  e/5-ball 
centered at (x,,  P(x,)),  for all i e I. Consequently, B(P,,)  D G(P),  for all n > N1. 
Consider any consecutive xi, xi+1. Note  that 0 <  x,+  -  x  ,  x  < 2/5,  and: 
Pn,(y,) < P(xi)  + 2/5,  and 
Pn  (y,  + 1)  > P(Xi+)  -  2E/5. 
Let  us  observe  that  for  every v  [P(x,+l),  P(x,)],  there exists  w(v)  [x,, x,+]  such  that  v E 
P(w(v)).  Consequently, the union of all e-balls around the points {(w(v),  v):  v e  [P(x,+l),  P(x,)]} 
covers  the  rectangle  D  {(y,v):  x, -  E/5 <y<x,1  +  /5  and  P(x,+l)  -  2/5  <  P(x,)+ 
2c/5}.  Using  (A.5),  note  that (y,, P,(yi))  D  and (y,,+,  P,(y, +))  D.  By  the  monotonicity  of 
P,(-),  it follows that G(P,)  c  B,(P),  demonstrating that p(P,  P,)  < E  for all n >  N1. 
Since Rn --  R uniformly, there also exists N2 such that for all n > N2, p(R,  R,)  < e. Using the fact 
that  Iy -  ql < 1, we conclude that p(J(q,  ), J,(q,  )) < 2e, for n >  max{Nl,  N2}. Consequently, the 
hypothesis of the theorem of the maximum is satisfied, so (2.1) holds for all q E [0,1]. 
It remains to be  argued that (2.2) is also satisfied. Consider any q E[0,1]  where t(-),  P(-),  and 
P(t(.))  are continuous.  Observe that each of  these functions  is  monotone:  hence  this restriction 
excludes at most countably many points. First, the theorem of the maximum implies that every cluster 
point  of  {t,(q)})=L  is an element of  T(q).  Now  T(-)  is single-valued at q since t(-)  is continuous: 
hence limn,,_  t,(q)  = t(q).  Second, observe from the definition of P(-)  that P(-)  is continuous at q 
if and only if  (-.) is continuous at q. Let p be any accumulation point of { P(q)}=l1  and let rk T  q 
and Sk i q be sequences of rationals. Then, for all k, Pn(rk)  > P,(q)  >  Pn(k),  and hence 4p(rk)  >p  > 
4(sk).  The continuity  of  0(-)  implies p  is unique and  p =  limk  -_.  (rk)-  P(q),  demonstrating 
that lim,n  Pn(q) =  P(q).  Third, since t(.)  and P(t(.))  are continuous at q,  P(.)  is continuous at 
t(q)  and, hence,  4(.)  is continuous at t(q).  Let p' be any accumulation point of { P(t  f(q))}=  1 and 
let  rk' T t(q)  and  sk J t(q)  be sequences of rationals. Observe that for every k >  0, there exists N(k) 
such  that  tn(q) E (rk, sk) for all  n > N(k).  Consequently,  P.(r')  > Pn(t.(q))  > Pn(s'),  for all  n > 
N(k),  and  0(rk)  > p'>  4(s)),  for all  k. As before, we can conclude lim  n  Pn(tn(q)) = P(t(q)). 
Finally,  by our construction of f,n(),  f  -  f  uniformly, and so lim_n  fn(q)  =f(q).  Observe now 
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that since (P,,  R,)  supports a weak-Markov equilibrium for f,,  we have for each n: 
(A.6)  fn (q)  -  P  (q)  = 8[fn,(q)  -  P,(  tn  (q))].  - 
By taking limits as n -  0oo,  we see that (2.2) is satisfied for all but (possibly) countably many q. 
Now  consider  any  of  the (at  most  countably  many)  excluded  q  (0,1].  Select  a  sequence of 
nonexcluded  qk  such  that  qk T q.  Since  (2.2)  is  satisfied for  all  qk  and  since  f,,(),  P,(-),  and 
P,(t  (.))  are left-continuous, we conclude that (2.2) is satisfied for q as well. This completes the proof 
of the theorem.  Q.E.D. 
Finally, we obtain the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION  4.3:  Along any weak-Markov equilibrium  path,  the monopolist does not randomize, 
except (possibly)  in the initial period. 
PROOF: Suppose  otherwise.  Then  there  exists  a  history  after  which  the  state  is  q  and  the 
monopolist randomizes among elements of P(T(q))  to yield an expected price p2 < pl = sup P(T(q)). 
Define  p'  by f(q)  -  ' = 8[f(q)  -  p],  i=  1,2.  By (2.2)  the price in  the previous period must have 
been  p  . We now claim that P(q)  > p,  showing that the monopolist could have profited by setting pl 
instead. To see this, first observe that T(.)  is a monotone increasing correspondence and so P(T(.))  is 
a nonincreasing correspondence. Next, let qn be such that qn I q and P(T(q,))  is single-valued. Then, 
using  (2.2):  P(q)  =  limn  o  P(q)  = limn0  [(1 -  8)f(qn)  + 8S(q)]  > (1 -  8)f(q)  + 8p1 =pl,  es- 
tablishing the proposition.  Q.E.D. 
APPENDIX  B 
THE  UNIFORM  COASE  CONJECTURE 
PROOF  OF THEOREM  5.4:  Suppose not. Then there exist  > 0,  a sequence {f, }n=1 cL,MN,a  a 
sequence of positive  numbers { z, }=l  -  0, and a sequence of weak-Markov equilibria {  P,  R, }=1 
such that the initial price S.(0) > E  for all n > 1. Construct (P,  R) as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Let 
y = inf{r:  P(r)  < E}. By left  continuity,  P(y)>  E, but  P(r)  < e  for every r>y.  Recall  that any 
weak-Markov equilibrium has sales in every period; hence S (0) > E implies  P.(0)  >  E for all n. But 
since Pn  is monotone  and fn(q) < L(1 -  q)a, we have P(1  -(e/2L)l/a)  f(!l  -  (e/2L)1/a)  < E/2, 
for all n > 1, implying that 0 < y < 1. 
Case I:  Suppose R(y)  > 0. 
Since  Rn --R  uniformly,  there exists  a  rational  q  (y<  q<l)  and  an  integer  nl  such  that 
Rn(q) > R(y)/2,  for all n > ni.  Since q > y,  P(q)  < e, so there exists o > 0 and integer n2 such that 
Pn(q)<  e -  for all  n > n2.  We will establish a lower bound on the real time t  before which the 
price  can  drop by  o, in equilibrium, and hence before which consumer q  purchases. Consumer 0 
prefers to purchase at the initial equilibrium price, which is at least e, to buying at a price below E  -  C 
at time t, so 1 -  E e->  t[  -  (E -  w)], or e-r  < 1 -  wo/(1  -  e +  O).  This gives an upper bound on the 
profits attainable by the monopolist: 
(B.1)  Rn()< )fP(x)dx+e-rtR  (q),  for all  n>  n2. 
Choose  any integer  m. Then for any consumer reservation price function  P.,  the monopolist  may 
charge prices (m -  l)/m,(m  -  2)/m,..,  l/m,  respectively, in the first (m -  1) periods. This earns 
the monopolist within 1/m  of all "available surplus," within a factor e-(m-2)z  of discounting. Hence 
R,(0)  > e-r(m  -2)z{  foPn(x) dx -  1/m}.  Since z, --  0, there exists n3(m) such that rzn  < 1/m2  for all 
n > n3(m),  and so: 
(B.2)  Rn (O) > e-l/m  Pn  (x)  dx-l/m),  for all  n > n3(m). 
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Since  0 < R(y)/2  < R,(q)  for all  n >  nl, there exists  an integer m  such that (B.1)  and (B.2)  are 
contradictory  for n > max  (nl,  2, n3(m)}. 
Case II:  Suppose R(y)  = 0. 
By hypothesis,  (Pn, Rn) is a subgame  perfect  equilibrium  for all n. Suppose  that, in the initial 
period,  the monopolist  chooses  to deviate  by charging  a price  of e/2. This  defines  a subgame.  We will 
show that, for sufficiently  large n, the posited  behavior  under  (P,  R,)  in this subgame  cannot  be 
optimal  for both the monopolist  and consumers. 
Observe  that any weak-Markov  equilibrium  has sales in every  period;  hence P,(O)  > e for all n. 
Customer  0 is optimizing  when  he purchases  at price e/2, so he must  believe  that the price  will not 
drop rapidly  thereafter.  In particular,  let t,  be the first  (real)  time  in which  the price  will drop  below 
e/4.  Then 1 -  E/2 > e-rt"[l  -  e/4].  Letting e-'  = (1 -  e/2)/(1  -  e/4),  we have t,  < t for all n. Thus 
a price  less than or equal  to e/4 is not charged  until at least time t. 
Recall that y has been defined  so that P(y) > e. Therefore,  there  exists a sequence  of rationals 
yn  t y such that P,(y,) > E/2 for all n. For arbitrarily  chosen z > 0, there  exists n1 such that z, < z 
for  all  n >  i.  Since  R(y)=O,  R,-*  R  uniformly,  and  Yn  -y,  there  also  exists  n2 such  that 
R,(yn)  < (1/4)eze-'t  for all n > n2. Write n for max{(n,  n2}. Meanwhile, let m be the greatest even 
integer  less than t/z.  Let pl,...,Pm  denote the first m prices  charged  by the monopolist  along a 
subgame  arising  after the monopolist  charges  an initial price po  = e/2.  (When  a mixed strategy  is 
called  for in period  1, let p, be the largest  price  which  the monopolist  randomizes  over.)  Observe  that 
Pm  > e/4.  Following  Gul-Sonnenschein-Wilson  (1986),  let a, = E/2 -  (2i/m)[/2  -Pm] for 0 < i 
m/2.  Define  an  alternative sequence pO,...,  Pm/2 by p[ = min  a,, p, }  (for 0 < i < m/2).  Observe 
that, by following  p6...,  Pm/2,  the monopolist  "does  not lose time"  on any sale and loses at most 
2(po -pm)/m  on each  sale.  Furthermore,  since Rn(yn)  < (1/4)Eze-rt and since  each  sale  before  time 
t is at a price greater  than e/4,  the total number  of customers  sold to at Pl,...,  pm is less than z. 
Let  Vn denote the net present value of  profits from following the equilibrium  price path 
Pi, P2, P3, .  after  a price  Po  = e/2 was  charged.  Let VI'  denote  the  value  from  following  p{,...,  P/2 
in the first  m/2  periods  and then  continuing  optimally.  Let VI"  denote  the value  to the monopolist  of 
playing  optimally,  beginning  in the period  after  a price  Pm  is charged.  Then: 
Vn -  Vn  > [e-rt/2  - e-  ]VJ" -  (2/m)(  po -p)z. 
We now place a lower bound on Vi'. Observe  that, in the period after pm is charged,  customer 
1-  (e/4L)l/a  remains in the market, since by the upper bound on  f,:  P,(1 -  (e/4L)l/a)  <f,(1  - 
(e/4L)1/")  < e/4.  Meanwhile,  customer  1-  (e/4L)/a/2  prefers  to purchase  at a price of [1- 
e-rz]f(l-  (e/4L)i/a/2)  this period to purchasing  at a price of zero next period. By Defini- 
tion  5.1,  f,(l  -  (/4L)l/a/2)  > M[1-(1-(e/4L)/a/2)]  =M(e/4L)2-  .  Hence,  a  price  of 
(M/2a)(E/4L)(1  -  e-)  induces all customers in  the interval [1 -  (/4L)a,1  -  (E/4L)1/a/2]  to 
purchase, so V,', > [1 -  e-rZ](M/21 +a)(/4L)  +(/a). 
Recall that (po - Pm)  < e/4 and m = t/z. Hence,  for sufficiently  small z (and the implied  n): 
Vn,  -  Vn  > (e-rt/2 _ e-rt)(1  -  e-rz)( M/21  +  a) (e/4L)l  +(l/a) -  (e/3t)z 
2 
(1--  e-rz){(e-rt/2-  e-rt)(M/21+a)(e/4L)l+(l/a) 
-(e/3t)(z2/(1-  e-rz))} 
Since lim  0 (z2/(1  -  e-rz))=  0,  Vn'  -  Vn  > 0 for sufficiently small choice of z. This contradicts our 
hypothesis  that,  for all n, (Sn,  P,) is a subgame  perfect  equilibrium.  Q.E.D. 
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